



# Summer passes, winter's coming

Monthly Investment Strategy

AXA IM Research September 2022



# Summary: September 2022

## Theme of the month: The energy market shock

- Russia has been able to cut gas supplies to Europe in response to economic sanctions as gas revenues form a smaller part of its total energy revenues and overall prices have risen.
- Europe is vulnerable to this supply interruption. However, swift action from European governments has reduced consumption (Germany by 20%, Italy closer to 8%) and rebuilt storage ahead of the winter. Germany is still likely to require additional restrictions (rationing) over the winter as are some CEE economies. Italy is close, but France and Spain should have sufficient supplies. The UK should also be self-sufficient given its LNG import terminals.
- The US has increased LNG exports to Europe by around 17bcm on the year over H1 2022, although an explosion at a terminal might constrain exports a little more in the second half. Longer-term, the US has the resource and plans to materially increase its energy exports. However, this will be a medium to longer term plan, with difficulties arising from appetites for long-term contracts.

## Macro update: Temperatures keep on rising for central banks

- European economies face a tough winter. We lower our Eurozone growth outlook to include a more distinct contraction in Q4 this year and Q1 next. We forecast a modest rebound thereafter, but a gas storage rebuild, and tight policy will prevent the level of growth rebounding to current levels by end 2023. The UK is also likely to fall into recession, despite a huge fiscal easing announced that has undermined confidence in UK markets.
- US news is mixed. The short-term drop in gasoline prices appears to be boosting Q3 activity. Falling real incomes, corporate profits, high inventory and tighter financial conditions still look set to push the US into a mild recession. Moreover, the Fed signalled higher rates into 2023. We expect a softer labour market to see the Fed peak at 4.25%, but without compelling evidence of slowdown it will move further.
- China has suffered recurrent setbacks from COVID, despite evidence suggesting a more muted reaction this time. Moreover, the authorities are merely ringfencing the housing market adjustment. We lower our growth outlook for 2022 to 3%. The upcoming Party Congress will help define the 2023 outlook
- CEE remains dominated by the energy crunch facing the rest of Europe and we lower our forecasts sharply here. Asian economies have benefitted from lower inflation to date. Latam has not, but significant policy tightening in several economies may leave policy close to the peak in several economies.

## Investment strategy: risky assets under pressure amid fresh wave of central bank hawkish repricing

- FX: USD to remain supported by the stronger US cyclical position, robust real yields and/or bouts of risk aversion. Pressure on the euro and sterling to continue and CNH should also keep trending lower. By contrast, the CHF might do better in Europe and the AUD might outperform high beta currencies.
- Rates: The jump in yields in September has been particularity brutal, compounding the worst drawdown in returns in decades. A rolling over in spot inflation levels now appears as a necessary condition for policy expectations and thus longer-term yields to stabilise.
- Credit: Credit has suffered too in the latest bout of risk aversion; bad, but not as bad as govie bonds. HY markets continue to offer attractive an entry point in both spread and yield terms, but a worsening macro backdrop merits prudence and dictates careful credit selection.
- Equity: The momentum of global equities has shifted since the end of August, following hawkish rhetoric by central bankers at the Jackson Hole symposium. Europe earnings growth forecasts for 2023 are holding up but GDP growth forecasts do not justify such expected levels of earnings.



# **Central scenario**

Summary – Key messages

#### Inflation

Supply-chain pressures ease, but energy and domestic pressures persist. Headline inflation pressures near peaks, but slow to fall next year.

#### Growth

Growth beginning to slow more obviously. Recessions expected in Europe and US. Gas interruption to result in severe slowdown over winter.

#### Rates

Rates push higher as Fed struggles to rein in economy. Technicals may account for some of inversion, but broadly reflects growth concerns.

#### Monetary policy

Most central banks continue to tighten as inflation high and concerns of inflation expectations rise. Slowing activity to alter this outlook around turn of year. PBoC and BoJ major exceptions.

Our central scenario: Tighter financial conditions and energy inspired inflation shock to see recession in Europe and the US.

We forecast global growth to rise by 3.1% and 2.4% in 2022 and 2023.

Economic slowdown amidst supply pressures and tighter monetary policy. Inflation slow to fall in 2023.

#### Credit

Volatile spreads in 2022 on central bank and geopolitics, but spreads now wide by standards of last decade.

#### Equities

Earnings expectations are getting shakier due to inflation & downside risks to growth. Despite already adjustment to date, risks still to downside.

#### **Fiscal policy**

Europe adding to fiscal supports to ameliorate cost-of-living. More material step-up if gas supply interruption occurs. US deadlocked in Congress.

#### **Emerging Markets**

Inflation rising across EM. Central banks hike more, some add FX intervention. Some fiscal response add to fragile finances

#### FX

Dollar continues to fresh peaks and appears extreme. Risk outlook key to support. Sterling collapses following new government stimulus.



# **Alternative scenarios**

# Summary – Key messages

Entrenched supply shock (probability 35%)

#### What could be different?

- Escalation in Ukraine conflict
- Russian oil supply interruption into European winter
- COVID outbreaks spreads again: China and/or new mutations
- Post-pandemic structural persist. Supply shocks last longer
- Inflation expectations rise, affecting wages and persistence

#### What it means

- Growth weaker, employment could start to fall, but inflation remains elevated
- Monetary policy ill-equipped to deal with supply shocks, deteriorating inflation credibility forces still tighter monetary policy in DMs

#### **Market implications**

- Risk appetite deteriorates / equities sell off / credit widens
- Sovereign yields reprice higher
- Dollar remains elevated
- EM debt to come under pressure

#### A global boost (probability 10%)

#### What could be different?

- Geo-political tensions ease peace in our time.
- Labour market participation recovers, strong income growth and easing inflation pressures
- Productivity boost following investment rebound and structural post-pandemic adjustments

#### What it means

- Growth surprises on the upside in most regions
- Inflation fades more quickly towards and below central bank targets
- Monetary policy proves more patient than expectations

#### **Market implications**

- Risk-on environment, equities make further gains, growth retains lead over value
- UST softens, EUR strengthens
- Spreads grind tighter



# **RISk Radar**

# Summary – Key messages



Short term

Long term



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# Theme of the month



# Russia turns off the taps

The energy market shock

## Russian invasion sparks gas shut off

 Russia provided 50% of European energy imports (50bcm) before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. While the EU is working towards energy embargoes on Russian oil and coal, it did not target Russian gas. Instead Russia has cut European gas supplies (barring a small amount to Italy).

#### Russia can afford gas shut off, not oil

 Russia is in a position to stop gas supplies to Europe as revenues are relatively small compared with oil revenues. Gas provided Russia with \$23bn revenues in 2021, 3.5% of total government revenues. Moreover, rising oil and gas prices have softened the revenue impact of falling volumes. Oil provided \$100bn and the impact of oil embargoes/price caps will be more critical to Russia

#### Gas prices rise sharply as Russia cuts supply



#### Natural Gas Prices UK, US and Netherlands

#### Gas revenues a relatively small part of Russia finance, oil is more



An Investment Managers

Source: Bloomberg, AXA IM Research, September 2022

# European dependence

# The energy market shock

### European gas dependence

- The lure of cheap and accessible energy has proven too much for most of Russia's close neighbours. Russia supplies significant amounts of energy flows to European economies. 70% of German gas consumption comes from Russian supply. This has left the economies – and their industries – particularly vulnerable to an interruption in supply.

## Germany's shortfall

Yet European authorities have been swift to react. Germany is already enacting gas consumption cuts of 20%, comprised of efficiency savings, demand reduction and rationing. Italy has reduced consumption by around 8% - a little short of the required 10%. More restrictions – including forced restrictions or rationing - may be needed depending on severity of winter and how quickly floating LNG terminals can be installed



#### Europe vulnerable to Russian gas supply

#### Gas flows and storage in Germany





# Counting the days

The energy market shock

#### Can Eurozone economies survive the winter

Based on estimated gas flows and average daily winter consumption, we estimate how many days consumption individual economies can make through the winter. We estimate Germany will have 195 days until mid-March, around 20 days short of the usual winter period. Italy is estimated at 170 days, until end-April and should get beyond mid-April's 'breakeven' day. France and Spain both have larger margins.

#### CEE dependence could add to German woe

Hungary, Slovakia and Czech Republic also face significant challenges to replace large dependence on Russian energy, with obvious alternative suppliers already under pressure. These are key part of German manufacturing supply chain and could add to German companies' supply constraints

#### Converting to average days

Number of days covered if Germany saves/rations gas by 20%; Italy by 10%



\*we extrapolated German Gas Storage Act, stating minimum filling level must be at least at 10% Source: Refinitiv, Eurostat, AXA IM Macro Research, as of Sept 11

#### Central and Easter European Exposure



Russian Gas Reliance (% of domestic consumption)



Source: IEA, AXA IM Research, 2020

# UK self sufficient barring bad winter

The energy market shock

### UK consumes most of its total supply over the winter

The UK has been able to re-export excess LNG to Europe to help it fill European storage ahead of winter during the summer (low demand) months. Historically the UK has imported gas from Europe over the winter, but this was a cost decision. UK LNG supply should fulfil its demand over the winter (barring a severe winter). However, UK exports will likely slow, but could continue through a mild winter

#### High LNG capacity, low storage

 The UK's high LNG import capacity has seen it maintain relatively low storage facilities (as Spain). The UK plans to increase storage by 5 bcm by re-opening the Rough storage facility. This would take storage to around 20 days and would raise UK's margin of selfsufficiency beyond a severe winter

#### UK gas supply should meet demand over winter months



Source: AXA IM Research, September 2022

#### Low gas storage reflects large LNG import capacity



Source: AXA IM Research, September 2022



# Long-term energy supplier

The energy market shock

## US LNG exports to Europe soared

- The US has made good on early promises to increase LNG supply to Europe. Over the first half of 2022, LNG exports have increased by over 17bcm compared to the previous year. Subdued Asia demand for LNG has facilitated re-shipping some of these flows. AN explosion at an LNG terminal will see less export in H2.

## Long-term energy supply capacity, but incentive

The US has planning permission (and hence plans) to double LNG export capacity over the coming decade. The production of
natural gas has been limited by supply-chain and labour shortages, as well as Federal planning law and investor appetite for
expansion. However, even if natural gas extraction increases at one-third the pace of 2017-19 it would be sufficient to double the
supply to the domestic market (of previous 17 years) and add 20bcm/annum for export

#### US LNG commitments large



#### Lacklustre response from US oil & gas to date



Source: EIA, AXA IM Research, September 2022



# Macro outlook



# Slower economic activity to feed into labour market

## US

### Gasoline provides boost

After contractions in Q1 and Q2, we expect to see a rise in Q3 GDP (0.8% annualised). Short-term indicators appear to be being buoyed by falling gasoline prices. We forecast a contraction in Q4, although if oil prices continue to fall (rather than rise), this may be postponed to next year. Falling real incomes, corporate profits, high inventory and tighter financial conditions should weigh on growth over the coming quarters. We forecast growth of 1.4% and -0.4% this year and next (consensus 1.6% and 0.9%).

#### Labour market resilience

Despite two quarters of contraction the labour market is showing only the first tentative signs of easing, and even then payrolls growth has been elevated. We expect slower economic activity to continue to soften the labour market over the coming months, although believe high levels of vacancies – pent up demand for labour – is dampening the pass through for now. Assuming modest supply recovery, we see unemployment rise to 4.4% next year and 4.7% in 2024.

### Financial conditions point to further GDP deceleration

#### Financial conditions and GDP



#### US employment growth remains robust







# Fed to keep tightening until "compelling evidence" to stop

## US

## Summer surprise in prices

August's headline inflation dropped to 8.3%, but core prices rose unexpectedly to 6.3% from 5.9%, with the monthly increase up 0.6%. On the month as well as persistently robust shelter prices a raft of other prices rose, including previously under pressure apparel and other goods. We expect some softening (on the month) in September, but our outlook for inflation is for it to fall back somewhat more slowly than markets expect. We forecast inflation at 8.2% and 5.2% this year and next (consensus 8.0% and 3.7%).

## Fed points to tighter policy

While there had been some tentative signs of easing labour market conditions, August's inflation we think spurred the Fed to a 75bp hike, taking rates to 3.25%. The Fed also raised its end-year rate projections to 4.4% (from 3.4% in June) and 4.6% (from 3.8%). This was even higher than market pricing and contributed to a further tightening in financial conditions. If the labour market slows as we expect, we forecast two more 50bps rate hikes taking policy to 4.25% by year-end. If it does not the Fed will continue to hike.

#### Core CPI inflation pressures rise in August



Headline and Core CPI Inflation

Source: BLS, AXA IM Research, September 2022

#### Fed signals to continue tightening until the job's done



Source: FRB, September 2022



# Gas rationing leading to recession

## Eurozone

## Tough winter ahead

We have moved our baseline outlook to a recession, projecting a cumulative 1.6% Eurozone GDP contraction between Q4 2022 and Q1 2023 – from a mild contraction in Q4. Necessary gas rationing during the winter at least in Germany and Italy is the main driver of the deeper retreat – with supply woes dominating the outlook despite soothing global supply chains, affecting all sectors of the economy.

### ...protracted recovery ahead

Countries will emerge with very low gas storage levels, requiring continued efforts to replenish stocks ahead of the following winter. The
policy mix is also likely to be much tighter than post-COVID-19, with inflation still high. We project the level of euro area GDP to be lower
than it is now at the end of our forecast horizon. We continue to see risks skewed to the downside.

#### Services: defying gravity is hard







Source: Eurostat, AXA IM Research, September 2022



#### Euro area GDP level unlikely to recover by end-2023

# ECB: Heading to upper-end of neutral

## Eurozone

## Projecting Deposit Rate at 2.0% by early 2023

Frontloading ECB interest rate increases looks set to continue. We expect the ECB to hike its deposit facility rate (DFR) by another +75bps to 1.5% in October, wary about inflation being "far too high above target" for too long and risking an unanchoring of inflation expectations, even as wage developments remain moderate. Given the latter, and our expected material output drop - not in ECB's baseline - we forecast a more moderate +25bps in December and February bringing the DFR to 2%.

## Risks for rates rising further - mind policy (mis)coordination

- The ECB Governing Council argues explicitly in favour of "further dampening demand" while President Christine Lagarde reiterated her mantra from Sintra that persistent supply shocks would be consistent higher rates not lower.
- Market expectations have increased substantially, staying at around 3.0% from mid-2023, reflecting US rate expectations. Despite this repricing, the euro reached a new 2022 low and these exchange rate concerns could also justify hiking rates faster higher.
- Additional fiscal policy response could further fuel additional inflation pressures.

#### Market firmly pricing ECB in restrictive territory



#### Eurozone supply woes means rates higher not lower



Anagers

# Government sets out Growth plan and energy bills support package

#### UK

## Chancellor sets out 'Growth Plan'

Public borrowing set to rise

- The Chancellor outlined plans to drive the UK economy into a "new-era" and raise underlying trend growth to 2.5%. The polices included large tax cuts and micro measures to incentivize investment. Official estimates of the Growth Plan (excluding energy bills support) is expected to cost £160bn over the next five years (c6% of GDP).

#### Energy price guarantee sees inflation capped

- Earlier this month, the Government had set out their energy bills support package. The package is forecasts to cost c£60bn over this financial year alone (six months) and we estimate this could rise to £150bn over the total period. This caps household energy costs at £2,500 and business energy costs are set to be frozen for six months. The cap in energy prices takes 3 ppts off our expected peak of inflation. We now see inflation rising to 10.6% in October compared to 13.6% in January 2023 before.



## Near term peak of inflation down by 3pts UK CPI inflation forecasts



Source: ONS, AXA IM Research, September 2022



# Markets fear Tory growth plan

#### UK

### Pound's slide to add to BoE concerns

The pound fell to an all time low of \$1.035 to the US dollar. Even before this, we had expected the pound's weakness to weigh
more on BoE decision making. The Chancellor added to market pressure over the weekend by stating that there was "more to
come". Speculation has grown that the Bank of England may be forced into an intermeeting hike. It is not obvious that such a
development would quell market fears, but we expect further communication from the BoE and government, over coming days.

#### Markets now see rates above 6% next year

Market pricing of rates has shifted significantly and now price Bank Rate above 6% by Summer 2023. We now expect rates to reach 4.00% early next year compared to 3.50% prior. We expect the BoE to hike Bank Rate by 75 basis points (bp) in November, but a continued slide in the pound could see them do more. In addition to expecting the BoE to move by 75bp in November, we now expect a 50bp hike in December and 25bp in February and March.

#### Selloff of UK assets continues



#### GBPUSD and Gilt yields

Source: Refinitv, AXA IM Research, September 2022

#### Markets now see Bank Rate at 6%



Source: Bloomberg, BoE, AXA IM Research, September 2022



# Economy recovers in August, but momentum may not last

## China

## Economy taken on a rollercoaster ride by COVID

- Shanghai's lockdown dealt a heavy blow to the Chinese economy. GDP sunk 2.6% sequentially in Q2, and yoy growth fell to 0.4% the lowest since early 2020. As Shanghai and surrounding provinces exited COVID controls, growth stabilized in May and rebounded in June. However, dark clouds have gathered again since July with Omicron making a comeback

## Recovery in August may not last

The August data surprisingly showed sequential growth improved across many parts of the economy. Major activity indicators beat
market expectations, with investment and retail sales growth nearly doubling from July. Some of this strength could be transitory –
the strong power production in response to an unusually hot summer is one example. Moreover, COVID-related restrictions have
tightened since September and extreme weather has prompted some regions to ration power usage. These call the sustainability
of the recovery beyond August into question

#### Domestic demand picks up while exports falter

Level change in economic activity relative to pre-COVID



#### Economy taken on a wild ride by COVID

High-frequency activity Indicator\*



-35 L \* Incl. steel production, cargo throughput, property sales, auto sales, truck freight, traffic congrestion and subway ride

Source: UBS, WIND, AXA IM Research, Sep 22



# COVID remains the biggest hurdle to recovery

## China

## Another COVID wave haunts the economy

Another COVID wave puts recovery at risk

- The recent COVID flare-up is a cause for concern. Even though case numbers are low relative to April-May, they are more widespread than the last wave. While refraining from another Shanghai-style lockdown, local governments are not taking any chances ahead of the Party Congress and have restarted tightening social and mobility restrictions. With a few major cities now engaging in various form of COVID controls, this will hurt the recovery and risk plunging the economy into a double-dip

## Recalibrating COVID response helps but not enough to save the economy

Despite the wider spread of infections, the degree of lockdown has not been as severe as seen in April-May. This is consistent with our view of a more lenient management of the "dynamic zero-COVID" policy. Hence, compared to Shanghai a few months, the current practice should help to mitigate, albeit not eliminate, the impact of the outbreak. Beijing has also responded to the mortgage boycott issue but fell short of rescuing the troubled developers. With time running out to revive growth, we have cut our full year growth forecast again to 3% from 3.6%, below the consensus at 3.5%





#### Beijing finetunes COVID response by avoiding a Shanghai-style lockdown

Source: GS, AXA IM Research, Sep 22



# Rising CPI in the spotlight

## Japan

## Headline CPI reaches highest rate since 1999

- Inflation rose by 3% y/y in August following a 2.6% rise in July. This marks the highest rate since December 1999 excluding the impact of consumption tax hikes. Prices are likely to continue to rise at a robust pace as energy and imported food costs continue to rise. Amidst rising inflation and declining real incomes, PM Kashida ordered Ministers to begin putting together a fresh stimulus package to support households and businesses.

## Growth continues to pick up, but destruction caused by Typhoon Nanmadool could weigh

GDP increased by 0.5% q/q in Q2 and we expect the recovery to continue into Q3 penciling in growth of 0.4% with PMIs rebounding following a decline in COVID concerns. Headwinds to growth remain. Weakening global demand will see growth begin to moderate. Japan has also faced the powerful Typhoon Nanmadool, the strongest typhoon to hit Japan the country since 2000. Despite the scale of damage and disruption caused, the it appears to have caused less economic damage than previous typhoons.



**CPI** - Contributions

#### Inflation pushes to 3% in August

Source: Refinitv, AXA IM Research, September 22

#### PMIs bounceback as COVID concerns abate

Japan Purchasing Managers' Index (PMI)





# FX Intervention sees pressure on yen abate

## Japan

## Yen slide prompts FX intervention

The increasing divergence between Japanese monetary easing and tightening conditions in most other developed markets has seen the yen face continued pressure, with the currency declining by 20% year to date over the year so far. This slide has pushed Japan's Ministry of Finance (MoF) to intervene in FX markets to support the yen for the first time since 1998. Following the intervention, the ven rose from lows of ¥145.8 to the US dollar. The move is likely to provide only temporary reprieve relief to the currency as divergence the Bank of Japan (BoJ)'s policy stance and the Federal Reserve – and other central banks – grows further.

## Governor Kuroda remains steadfast in easing

The yen has extended its declines against the dollar

At its recent meeting, the BoJ reaffirmed its commitment to accommodative policy and kept all policy measures unchanged. There was some adjustment to its COVID-19 support package, with the BoJ taking the decision to phase out its COVID support for business. Governor Haruhiko Kuroda reaffirmed his commitment to maintaining the current easing stance and made clear that he did not intend the BOJ to follow the path of moving away from negative interest rates that has been taken by other central banks.





# 10Y JGBs remain close to upper YCC target



# Is the economy beginning to soften?

## Canada

## Strong first half to fade

Canada posted strong growth of 3.1% and 3.3% (annualised) in the first two quarters of this year. Yet monthly numbers show this centred around a post-COVID bounce in Q1. Mechanically this will see a much weaker Q3, not least if a 2.5% fall in retail sales in July translates to a dip in monthly output. We forecast 1.2% growth in Q3 and something closer to stagnation by year-end, leaving growth at 3.3% for 2022 and 0.7% for 2023. 3.3% is now consensus, but we are below the 1.1% outlook for next year.

### First signs of loosening labour market

The unemployment rate has fallen to record lows. Yet weaker growth has seen employment fall in the last three months (to August). Still faster declines in labour supply saw unemployment reach 4.9%, before a rise in supply in August saw it rebound to 5.4%. Broader questions remain over Canadian labour supply, but for now we forecast a modest rise. This should outpace all but stagnant job growth over the coming quarters and see unemployment gently rise to 5.7% by year-end and 6.5% by end-2023.



Canada's Feb/Mar boost disguises softer trend

#### Source: CANISM, Refinitiv, AXA IM Research, September 2022

#### Unemployment rises as labour supply recovers







# BoC peak coming into sight

## Canada

## CPI turns, but a long way to go

Headline inflation fell to 7.0% in August, from 7.6%. Most of the decline reflected a fall in energy prices. However, different measures of core inflation all declined somewhat as well. Inflation has a long way to fall to move back in line with the BoC's target. However, we lower our forecast for this year to 6.8% and pencil in 4.3% for next (consensus 7.0% and 3.4%).

## BoC "assessing how much higher .. to go"

The BoC hiked rates by 75bps in September, delivering 175bps of tightening to take Bank Rate to 3.25% since stating that it was "prepared to act forcefully". In September, it changed guidance to say it was "assessing how much higher interest rates need to go". With economic activity appearing to soften and the labour market to loosen, we expect the BoC to hike by 50bps in October, but suggest that could be its last hike (at 3.75%), although we acknowledge the risk of a further 25bps in December to peak at 4.00% in line with market consensus.

#### CPI inflation dips on energy, but more broadly

#### **CPI** measured variations



#### BoC's 'frontloading' sees it lead the pack



CA, UK, US & ECB Policy Rates

Source: Refinitiv, CANISM, ECB, BoE, AXA IM Research, September 2022



# Central Europe : heading into a "cold" winter

# **Emerging Markets**

## Particularly reliant on Russian gas, recession on cards in the wake of Russian gas supply shutdown

- Landlocked Hungary or the Czech Republic will be directly affected by gas shortages as well as second round effects coming from the weakening economic activity in Germany, their largest trading partner. We have trimmed our GDP growth forecasts by 4ppt of GDP cumulatively affecting Q4 2022 and Q1 2023 projections, implying GDP contraction by 2.4% and 1.8% respectively in 2023. Poland is less gas intensive, with a greater reliance on coal; we expect GDP growth of +0.9% for 2023 overall.
- Central banks have been hiking interest rates for some time now, but most countries still show negative policy rates (using Bloomberg consensus 2023 inflation expectations). With the ECB appearing more hawkish of late, this buffer versus Europe is likely to be insufficient.

#### Trimming growth outlook on recession expectations



Central Europe GDP growth forecasts (%)



Still mostly negative real rates across CEE



# Some signs of rates peaking in Latam

# **Emerging Markets**

### Headline CPI numbers continue to trend upwards, though some seems to have peaked

- Since December 2021, headline inflation figures across Asia have accelerated by between 120bps (MA) to 570bps (TH). Compared to other parts of EM and rest of the world, inflationary pressure in Asia seem to be relatively well maintained as governments in the region have implemented measures (from energy to food and fertilizer subsidies) to help contain prices. In Latam, while inflation has been rising much faster, it seems to have peaked in some economies such as Peru and Brazil, hinting at the prospective end of their respective hiking cycles .

#### Latam's busy electoral calendar is coming to an end

 Colombians recently elected left-wing Gustavo Petro as president. The new leader plans to overhaul the tax code and the pension system to allow for more social spending. In contrast, voters in Chile rejected the new constitutional draft that would have given the state a larger role in the economy. Brazil's upcoming general elections (Oct 2) will be the region's last important election. Former president Lula da Silva commands a comfortable lead over its main rival incumbent, president Jair Bolsonaro.



#### Governments are under pressure to respond to rising prices



## General elections will take place in Brazil on 2 October

Source: Datafolha and AXA IM Research, September 2022.

Brazilian elections: voter preference (%)



# **Investment Strategy**



# Multi-Asset Investment views

# Our key messages and convictions

Negative on Equites



Neutral Sovereign Bonds

# #1

Economic activity rapidly decelerating while persistent inflation pressuring central banks to slow growth further

#4

decelerates

# #3

Central banks hiking cycle priced in, limiting bond yield upside. But inflation has not yet peaked

# #2

Pricing at levels consistent

with positive returns over

default expectations should

further increase as activity

medium term. However,

Valuations have improved following recent spread widening albeit not attractive enough to warrant being overweight

Neutral on Investment Grade Credit

Neutral on High Yield Credit



Source: AXA IM as at 23/09/2022

# **FX Strategy**

# Hopes for a peak in USD strength have been dashed

- USD to remain supported by the stronger US cyclical position and/or bouts of risk aversion. US real rates look more robust.
- Pressure on EUR & GBP to continue. Escalating energy crisis has further downgraded European growth outlook, erasing EU current account surplus and deteriorating UK's deficit. Weak EU export demand by China and Brexit disruptions. High inflation means cheaper fair value.
- CNH should also keep trending lower. China Zero Covid policy continues to disrupt production and the PBOC needs to stay accommodative to counter this and the real estate deleveraging. Lower global goods demand should weaken China's trade balance.
- CHF might do better in Europe. Switzerland growth looks better due to lower energy dependency and energy intensive industry. SNB is now accepting CHF strength to tame rising imported inflation.
- AUD might outperform high beta currencies, supported by an extremely tight labour market, amid more resilient domestic growth and consumption. Gas exports are also taking over from iron ore prices in generating further budget and trade balance surpluses.

#### Real rates support USD in G4 & risk sentiment drives high beta ccy USDCNH can rise further as PBOC divergence from the Fed widens







# **Rates Strategy**

# Inflation remains a key driver for both policy-makers and markets

- US Treasury yields, UK Gilt yields and global bond yields in general have posted new highs for this year, mainly driven by central bank policy expectations. The moves in mid September have been particularity brutal, compounding the worst drawdown in returns in decades.
- Longer term breakeven inflation in the US has traded rangebound below 2.5% since July, despite the fact that spot inflation prints have kept surprising on the upside. A rolling over in spot inflation levels now appears a necessary condition for policy expectations and thus longer term yields to stabilise.
- Interestingly, both the cyclical peak Fed policy rate (1y1m) and the equilibrium Fed policy rate (5y1m) have drifted higher since the summer, perhaps signalling a degree of uncertainty with regards to central bank policy effectiveness in taming near inflation pressures.



#### Fed policy expectations continue to drive US Treasury yields higher



#### Market implied policy expectations have drifted higher since summer



# **Credit Strategy**

# Credit has suffered too in the latest bout of risk aversion bad not as bad as govie bonds

- The latest deterioration in risk appetite has reversed the rebound in credit returns in July. Yet the relative resilience in spreads has kept the 2022 performance drawdown from making new lows, in contrast to what has happened in government bond markets. So while key bond markets have lost anything from a quarter to a third of their market value from their peak, HY credit losses have been in 'teen' figures.
- HY markets continue to offer attractive entry points in both spread and yield terms, but a worsening macro backdrop merits prudence and dictates careful credit selection. Indeed, as default predictors have deteriorated, the gap between spread implied defaults and forecast default has narrowed. Excess spreads net of expected default losses remain positive but not as generous as earlier in the year.
- In relative terms, European credit continues to screen cheaper than US credit, but the potentially profitable normalisation trade of long Europe vs the US is not likely to get underway before more clarity on the energy risks for European growth.



#### 2022 has seen the 5th worst drawdown in EUR HY since 1998 Default valuations have started to narrow as macro backdrop worsens





# **Equity Strategy**

# Temperature drop at all levels, summer is over

- The momentum of global equities has shifted since the end of August, following hawkish rhetoric by central bankers at the Jackson Hole symposium. Over the past month, world stocks have fallen -7.7%, with the decline of the 'long duration' Growth factor by -10% accounting for most of this. Growth concerns have also weighed on cyclical stocks (-9.1%), which have been struggling this year (-23.4%). In this environment, the energy sector (-2.4%) remains the most resilient, benefiting from a tight commodities market, while defensive stocks (-5.5%) have also fared better as fears of recession in upcoming quarters have escalated.
- Surprisingly, Europe earnings growth forecasts for 2023 are holding up. Revisions over the past 3 months are still positive (+1.9%) despite being negative for US (-3%) and emerging markets (-2.1%). Even if a weaker currency supports these revisions (about 60% of European equity sales are made abroad), it should not erase the impact of the expected global economic slowdown, especially in Europe. GDP growth forecasts do not justify the expected levels of earnings next year. Embedding our European GDP growth forecast for 2023, next year's earnings growth is expected to hover around zero. Quarters with negative annual growth tend to be associated with negative earnings growth.



#### Jackson Hole, a turning point for risky assets

#### In Europe, the consensus remains too optimistic for 2023



Source: Eurostat, IBES and AXA IM Research



Source: MSCI and AXA IM Research

# Asset allocation stance

# Positioning across and within asset classes

| Asset Allocation  |  |  |  |  |     |
|-------------------|--|--|--|--|-----|
| Key asset classes |  |  |  |  | De  |
| Equities          |  |  |  |  | Eur |
| Bonds             |  |  |  |  | UK  |
| Commodities       |  |  |  |  | Sw  |
| Cash              |  |  |  |  | US  |
|                   |  |  |  |  | Jap |
|                   |  |  |  |  | Em  |
|                   |  |  |  |  | Em  |
|                   |  |  |  |  | Eur |
|                   |  |  |  |  | Eur |
|                   |  |  |  |  | Eur |
|                   |  |  |  |  | US  |
|                   |  |  |  |  | US  |
|                   |  |  |  |  |     |

| Equities                  |  |  |  |  |  |
|---------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|
| Developed                 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Euro area                 |  |  |  |  |  |
| UK                        |  |  |  |  |  |
| Switzerland               |  |  |  |  |  |
| US                        |  |  |  |  |  |
| Japan                     |  |  |  |  |  |
| Emerging & Equity Sectors |  |  |  |  |  |
| Emerging Markets          |  |  |  |  |  |
| Europe Cyclical/Value     |  |  |  |  |  |
| Euro Financials           |  |  |  |  |  |
| European Autos            |  |  |  |  |  |
| US Financials             |  |  |  |  |  |
| US Russell 2000           |  |  |  |  |  |
|                           |  |  |  |  |  |
|                           |  |  |  |  |  |

Neutral

Negative

Legend

Positive

Change

▲ Upgrade

| Fixed Income         |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|----------------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Govies               |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Euro core            |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Euro peripheral      |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| UK                   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| US                   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Inflation Break-even |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| US                   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Euro                 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Credit               |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Euro IG              |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| US IG                |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Euro HY              |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| US HY                |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| EM Debt              |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| EM Bonds HC          |  |  |  |  |  |  |

▼ Downgrade

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# Forecasts & Calendar



# Macro forecast summary

# Forecasts

| Real CDR growth (%) | 2021 | 20     | 2022*     |        | 2023*     |  |
|---------------------|------|--------|-----------|--------|-----------|--|
| Real GDP growth (%) | 2021 | AXA IM | Consensus | AXA IM | Consensus |  |
| World               | 6.1  | 3.1    |           | 2.4    |           |  |
| Advanced economies  | 5.1  | 2.2    |           | 0.1    |           |  |
| US                  | 5.5  | 1.4    | 1.7       | -0.4   | 0.7       |  |
| Euro area           | 5.2  | 3.0    | 2.8       | -0.5   | 0.9       |  |
| Germany             | 2.6  | 1.3    | 1.5       | -1.5   | 0.7       |  |
| France              | 6.8  | 2.4    | 2.4       | 0.0    | 1.2       |  |
| Italy               | 6.6  | 3.3    | 3.0       | -0.6   | 1.1       |  |
| Spain               | 5.1  | 4.7    | 4.3       | 0.6    | 2.3       |  |
| Japan               | 1.7  | 1.5    | 1.4       | 1.7    | 1.6       |  |
| UK                  | 7.2  | 3.4    | 3.4       | -0.2   | 0.1       |  |
| Switzerland         | 3.5  | 2.3    | 2.5       | 0.6    | 1.2       |  |
| Canada              | 4.4  | 3.3    | 3.5       | 0.7    | 1.5       |  |
| Emerging economies  | 6.7  | 3.6    |           | 3.9    |           |  |
| Asia                | 7.0  | 4.4    |           | 5.1    |           |  |
| China               | 8.1  | 3.6    | 3.7       | 5.2    | 5.4       |  |
| South Korea         | 4.1  | 2.3    | 2.6       | 2.0    | 1.9       |  |
| Rest of EM Asia     | 6.1  | 5.6    |           | 5.2    |           |  |
| LatAm               | 6.8  | 2.8    |           | 2.0    |           |  |
| Brazil              | 4.6  | 1.5    | 1.8       | 1.0    | 0.8       |  |
| Mexico              | 4.8  | 1.7    | 1.9       | 1.3    | 1.6       |  |
| EM Europe           | 6.7  | -0.7   |           | -0.2   |           |  |
| Russia              | 4.7  | -6.0   |           | -3.5   |           |  |
| Poland              | 6.0  | 4.8    | 4.8       | 0.9    | 2.3       |  |
| Turkey              | 11.5 | 5.6    | 3.7       | 1.5    | 2.3       |  |
| Other EMs           | 5.4  | 4.2    |           | 3.7    |           |  |

Source: Datastream, IMF and AXA IM Macro Research – As of 27 September 2022



# Expectations on inflation and central banks

# Forecasts

## Inflation Forecasts

| CPI Inflation (%)  | 2021 | 2022*  |           | 2023*  |           |
|--------------------|------|--------|-----------|--------|-----------|
|                    | 2021 | AXA IM | Consensus | AXA IM | Consensus |
| Advanced economies | 3.2  | 7.2    |           | 4.7    |           |
| US                 | 4.7  | 8.2    | 8.1       | 5.2    | 3.8       |
| Euro area          | 2.6  | 8.1    | 7.8       | 5.5    | 4.1       |
| China              | 0.9  | 2.1    | 2.4       | 2.3    | 2.5       |
| Japan              | -0.2 | 2.3    | 2.0       | 1.3    | 1.4       |
| UK                 | 2.6  | 9.0    | 8.6       | 5.6    | 5.6       |
| Switzerland        | 0.5  | 2.8    | 2.7       | 2.0    | 1.6       |
| Canada             | 3.4  | 6.8    | 7.0       | 4.3    | 3.5       |

Source: Datastream, IMF and AXA IM Macro Research – As of 27 September 2022

## Central banks' policy: meeting dates and expected changes

| Central bank policy<br>Meeting dates and expected changes (Rates in bp / QE in bn) |              |           |                  |                  |                  |                 |
|--|--------------|-----------|------------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------|
|  |              | Current   | Q3-22            | Q4-22            | Q1-23            | Q2-23           |
|  | Dates<br>Fed |           | 26-27 July       | 1-2 Nov          | 31-1 Jan/Feb     | 2-3 May         |
| United States - Fed  |              | 1.50-1.75 | 20-21 Sep        | 13-14 Dec        | 21-22 Mar        | 13-14 Jun       |
|  | Rates        |           | +1.5 (3.00-3.25) | +1.0 (4.00-4.25) | unch (4.00-4.25) | unch (4.00-4.25 |
|  | Dates        |           | 21 July          | 27 Oct           | 2 Feb            | 4 May           |
| Euro area - ECB  |              | -0.50     | 8 Sep            | 15 Dec           | 16 Mar           | 15 Jun          |
|  | Rates        |           | +1.5 (0.75)      | +1.0 (1.75)      | 0.25 (2.00)      | unch (2.00)     |
|  | Dates        |           | 20-21 July       | 27-28 Oct        | Jan              | May             |
| Japan - BoJ  |              | -0.10     | 21-22 Sep        | 19-20 Dec        | Mar              | Jun             |
|  | Rates        |           | unch (-0.10)     | unch (-0.10)     | unch (-0.10)     | unch (-0.10)    |
|  | Dates        |           | 4 Aug            | 3 Nov            | Feb              | May             |
| UK - BoE   |              | 1.00      | 15 Sep           | 15 Dec           | Mar              | Jun             |
|  | Rates        |           | +1.00 (2.25)     | +1.25 (3.50)     | +0.5 (4.00)      | unch (2.50)     |



# Calendar of 2022 events

| 2022      | Date         | Event  | Comments |
|-----------|--------------|--|----------|
|           | Q3-Q4 2022   | Chilean Constitutional Referendum  |          |
| September | 25 September | Italian Elections  |          |
| September | 30 September | Possible U.S. Government Shutdown  |          |
|           | October      | China's 20th National Congress- President Xi to be re-elected (expected) |          |
| October   | 2 October    | Brazil General Elections   |          |
|           | 30 October   | Brazil Presidential Elections (second round)                             |          |
|           | 2 November   | FOMC meeting   |          |
| November  | 3 November   | UK Monetary Policy Report & MPC Summary and minutes                      |          |
|           | 8 November   | US Midterm Elections   |          |
| December  | 14 December  | FOMC meeting   |          |
| December  | 15 December  | MPC Summary and minutes  |          |



# Latest publications

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